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The European Idea: The Scandinavian Answer
Norwegian Attitudes Towards a Closer Scandinavian Economic
Cooperation 1947-19591
Ingrid Sogner
In 1947 the Norwegian government proposed to extend economic cooperation
between the Nordic countries.2 This suggestion launched twelve years of thorough
investigations; the options considered included the establishment of a Scandinavian
customs union - a suggestion never to be realized. In 1959 EFTA was instead
established, with the three Scandinavian countries included among the seven
founding countries. Contemporary observers claimed that the Scandinavian cus-
toms union henceforth ". . . at most would serve as a subject for dissertations for
future researchers on Nordic cooperation".3 This article is based on my dissertation
on the plans for a Scandinavian customs union, and the Norwegian attitude
towards these.
Norway has been judged, both by contemporaries and in hindsight by
researchers, to be the most reluctant among the Scandinavian countries towards
Scandinavian cooperation and a Scandinavian customs union. This conclusion will
be discussed and modified in this article. My argument is that Norway throughout
this period pursued a fairly consistent and positive policy towards closer Scandi-
Ingrid Sogner, born 1964, Cand. Philol., holds a research fellowship at the Centre for Defence Studies, University
of Aberdeen. She is currently engaged in a project entitled "Norway and Europe: Security and Political Implications ".
Address: Centre for Defence Studies, Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street, Aberdeen AB9 2TY, Scotland.
1This article is based on my dissertation in history: Norges holdninger til nordisk  økonomisk samarbeid
1947-1959, University of Oslo, spring 1992, and was financed by a grant from the Ryoichi Sasakawa
Fund. Several researchers and institutions have been very forthcoming and helpful to me. First, I am
very grateful to The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, for providing me with facilities and an
encouraging environment during the writing of this article. A stay at the European University Institute in
Florence, and participation in the seminars of Professor Richard T. Griffiths were enormously
stimulating. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Helge Ø. Pharo for taking time to read the manuscript
and not least for correcting the language, even though his official role as supervisor is over.
2 The Norwegian suggestion formally included all the Nordic countries, and thereby justfied the term
"Nordic" which defines Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. For most of the period in
question, however, the talks and the plans for an extended economic cooperation only covered the three
Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. I will therefore use the terms "Scandinavia"
and "Scandinavian" throughout this article. The actors of this period did, however, more often use the
terms "Norden" and "Nordic". This is reflected in the names of the committees established.
3 Veikko Karsma, För Norden, 1959/4, quoted after Jan A. Andersson, Ide och Verklighet - Föreningarna
Norden genom 70 år - , (1991). My translation.
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navian cooperation, and that key actors within the government regarded Scandi-
navian economic cooperation as an element of the Norwegian planned economy.
The Scandinavian plans can be regarded as Norway's first introduction to the
new approach to economic cooperation as developed through European integration.
During these twelve years of investigations, Norway's attitude changed fun-
damentally as regards her own economic policy, as regards closer Scandinavian
cooperation, and as regards European integration. By highlighting some of the
crucial questions Norway and the Scandinavian countries were confronted with in
the years when the idea of European integration was introduced and developed,
we also gain insight into the Scandinavian countries' approach to and eventual
participation in EFTA.
1. The proposal of a Scandinavian economic cooperation and the role of
the Marshall Plan
Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange set forth the idea of widening coop-
eration between the Scandinavian countries at a meeting between the Danish,
Norwegian and Swedish foreign ministers on 9 July, 1947.  4 At the end of August,
at another Scandinavian Foreign Ministers' meeting, which also included Iceland,
the idea was developed, and it was agreed to set up a group of experts to examine
the possibilities of extending cooperation between the four countries.5 The purpose
of the group was primarily to look at the possibilities of mutual economic support
between the countries, but the foreign ministers also agreed on the necessity for
examining the conditions for long-term economic cooperation, and a key issue was
the possible elimination of intra-Scandinavian customs barriers.
The Norwegian initiative was forwarded in the wake of Secretary of State George
Marshall's speech on 5 June 1947, in which he announced American willingness
to contribute economically to the reconstruction and further economic growth of
Europe. The European Recovery Programme, which became the Marshall Plan's
official name, was not, however, offered unconditionally. The Europeans in return
had to coordinate their efforts, rather than claim individual help. The European
governments consequently had to consider the American offer on two levels: did
they require economic help, and what were the implications with regard to closer
cooperation with other European states, i.e. a closer integration. The American
proposal, with its implicit demand for coordination, led the British and the French
to convene a conference in Paris in July to discuss the establishment of a European
organization.6 Alan Milward has judged this initiative to have been presented to
accommodate as well as contain the American pressure for coordination. It implied
resistance to and a redirecting of the American ideas about integration, in fact
fundamental opposition to US plans. I shall not deal with Milward's thesis here.
4 Stortingsmelding no. 87/1954; Leon Dalgas Jensen, "Denmark and the Marshall Plan, 1947-48: The
Decision to Participate", Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 14:1, (1989), p. 63. This first initiative in
July seems to have been a spontaneous idea from Halvard Lange, forwarded on that meeting without
any preparation from the Norwegian side. I have not found any material on this besides the
Stortingsmelding and the reference from Dalgas Jensen. The inititiative was, however, followed up in
August.
5 Utenriksdepartementets arkiv: The Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Archives, hereafter UD:
dossier 44 3/4, vol. 1. Various documents; and Leon Dalgas Jensen, op. cit., p. 65.
6 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (Methuen & Co., 1984), p. 61.
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However, the Norwegian proposal for a widening of the Scandinavian cooperation,
offers an interesting parallel to the Franco-British initiative.
Europe's trading system after 1945 was characterized by high customs levels,
quota restrictions, an intricate pattern of bilateral trade agreements and non-
convertible currencies, both as leftovers from inter-war protectionism and necessary
means of postwar reconstruction. High tariff levels were not the main problem of
European trade, because even with high tariffs, import volumes were still deter-
mined by conditions of supply and demand and the decisions of policy-makers.
For the policy-makers, quantitative trade restrictions at the frontiers, supplemented
with strict rationing in the domestic markets, were far more effective ways of
implementing import priorities and curbing consumer demand.7 The economic
system of the United States was ideally based on free trade, and American policy-
makers judged these European restrictions as the main obstacles to world trade,
and consequently worked actively for the freeing of Western European trade and
the liberalization of these economies. American policy towards Western Europe
was therefore to demand a removal of quantitative restrictions, and to encourage
the establishment of a customs union.8
All the three Scandinavian countries had relatively low tariffs, though Norway's
tariffs were higher than those of Denmark and Sweden, and all had a well-developed
system of quota restrictions by which they controlled their trade.9 During the
reconstruction period after World War II the Labour Party held office with an
absolute majority in the Storting, and economists were well represented in its
leadership, with central advisers such as Arne Skaug and Gunnar Bøe, and the
leading politician in the field, the Minister of Finance, and later Minister of Trade,
Erik Brofoss.10 In Norway, more than in most countries, economic planning was
concentrated on the work with the annual national budgets, which were introduced
from 1947. From 1948 on came also the long-term programmes (4-year
programmes) and the economic perspective analyses. The planned economy and
national budgeting became almost synonymous concepts in Norway. The National
Budget was to become much more important in economic planning in Norway,
7 Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe 1945-1957 (NEHA-series/
Amsterdam, 1990), p. 2.
8 The proposal of the International Trade Organization was one attempt to liberalize the world trade,
but it failed on Congressional opposition. The signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade-GATT-in 1947, between a limited number of countries, was then to provide the negotiating
framework for multilateral tariff reductions. In 1948 the Organization for the European Economic
Cooperation - the OEEC - was established, as the somewhat meagre result of this American pressure
for coordination. OEEC had as its main priority the removal of its member countries' quantitative
restrictions.
9 The coming passage is mainly based on Trond Bergh: "Norsk Økonomisk politikk", in Vekst og
Velstand, (Universitetsforlaget, 1981); Tore Jorgen Hanisch, "Krig og gjenreisning", in Veien til velstand
(Universitetsforlaget, 1986); Bergh Hanisch, Vitenskap og politikk, (Oslo, 1984).
10 Erik Brofoss was both a lawyer and an economist, and highly trusted by the Prime Minister Einar
Gerhardsen and the rest of the government. Arne Skaug was Director of the National Bureau of
Statistics  1946-1948, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (statssekretaer i UD)  1948-1949,
Minister and Ambassador in the Norwegian permanent delegation to the OEEC in Paris 1949-1955
and Minister of Trade 1955-1962. Gunnar Bee was Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen's Personal
Secretary 1945-1947, Assistant Secretary (byråsjef) in the Ministry of Trade 1947-1948. B0e was
spokesman for the leftwing in the Norwegian Labour Party, and very critical to the continental
countries' economic policies. He became Minister of Wages and Prices in 1959, but resigned in 1962,
because of the Norwegian application to the EC.
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where it acquired a programmatic nature, than in the other Scandinavian countries,
where it was launched later and had more the nature of prognosis. This had a
centralizing effect, that led to a concentration of economic power in the government
and central administration.
Norway at first rejected the American offer of economic aid. This response was
both based on an economic judgement — Norway's financial situation was at this
time still considered satisfactory — and because it meant aligning with one of the
superpowers, which for Norway meant leaving her highly valued "bridge-building-
policy". The idea of a coordinated European economic policy was rejected by
Norwegian economic policy-makers, who in the short run had no intention of
easing up on their thoroughly controlled economic policy. Norwegian policy-
makers also held a deep-rooted scepticism towards the continental countries'
economic policies. 11
Lange's proposal for closer Scandinavian economic cooperation was, as we saw,
first forwarded at the meeting in July which was intended to coordinate the
Scandinavian countries' positions in Paris. Lange's argument was that Scandi-
navian cooperation would emphasize that Scandinavia did not need American aid,
and that it was necessary for the Scandinavians to stand together against United
States' infringement of national sovereignty.12 The Norwegian suggestion of a
widening of Scandinavian cooperation was in other words a way to secure the
Scandinavian countries a stronger position in Paris, a way to show independence,
and not a proposal for cooperation as desirable in itself.
The meeting in Paris revealed that the United States had wide-ranging plans
for European cooperation, both politically and economically, in the form of a
European customs union.13 The deep gap between different European countries
over economic issues was also revealed in Paris, with the British strongly opposed
to the idea of a European customs union, and the French in favour. In spite of the
attempt at creating a common Scandinavian front at the meeting, their different
needs and interests became apparent in Paris. The difference between Denmark
and Norway was most noticeable. The Norwegian Labour Party was, as already
mentioned, highly sceptical of the countries on the Continent and their economic
policy, and judged closer integration with them as a threat towards both the
Norwegian "bridge-building policy" and against Norwegian economic policy.14
The Norwegian government also felt less dependent upon Marshall aid than
most other European countries. Even although the Norwegian supply of dollars
was limited in the summer of 1947, Norway's position was considered far superior
to the Danish one, which indeed was precarious. Denmark showed some interest
in the idea of a European customs union. Because of Danish agricultural exports,
11 Helge Ø. Pharo, "Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction", Scandinavian Journal of History, No. 1. (1976),
pp. 128-130.
12 Leon Dalgas Jensen, "Denmark and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1948: the Decision to Participate", in
Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 14:1, (1989).
13 Alan Milward, op. cit., p. 70; and Helge Pharo, op. cit.. After some initial meetings in Paris where
the Soviet Union had withdrawn from the negotiations (and with them, also the Eastern European
States), 16 Western European countries had met in Paris and established the Committee of European
Economic Cooperation - CEEC.
14 Riksarkivet, The Norwegian National Archives (hereafter RA), Regjeringens Økonomiske utvalg,
The Government's Economic Committee (hereafter R0U), 19.10.47; Topic no. 2, Study Group -
West European Customs Union; Leon Dalgas Jensen, op.cit., p. 65.
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Denmark had a greater immediate interest in liberalizing international trade than
many of the West European countries, including Norway and Sweden. Danish
exports to Great Britain also made the Danes more interested in seeing Com-
monwealth preferences reduced, and to a wish to remove the existing economic
restrictions in Europe.15
It was within this framework that the Norwegian suggestion for closer Scandi-
navian cooperation was further worked out at the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers'
meeting in August 1947. At that meeting, Denmark chose to give priority to
Scandinavian cooperation and soft-pedal European cooperation. The three Scandi-
navian countries agreed to investigate a Scandinavian alternative.16
Economically, Norway was relatively less developed than Denmark and Sweden.
Compared with Sweden, Norway was relatively behind in sectors and markets in
which they were competing. The basis for both the Norwegian and the Swedish
economies was iron ore, wood products, and cheap electricity, with the addition
of fisheries in Norway. Consequently the two countries were competitive on both
their domestic and their export markets. Norwegian manufacturing industry feared
Swedish competition, as Swedish industry was both more advanced from before
the war, and less affected by war time wear and destruction. In addition, the
Norwegian government had after the war invested heavily in and promoted the
export industry at the expense of the domestic industry. However, under the
protection of the quota system it was the home industry that had grown fastest.
Denmark had a strong and strongly export-orientated agricultural production, and
could easily challenge the Norwegian agriculture if the restrictions on the intra-
Scandinavian trade were abandoned. However, it was clear from the beginning of
the Scandinavian talks that agriculture would not be included.
When we study the Scandinavian trade figures we see that intra-Scandinavian
trade was not of primary importance to any of the Scandinavian countries: 17
Percent of trade:
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 19
Import:
Denmark 15 15 15 15 14 15
Norway 19 19 19 20 18 21
Sweden 8 8 8 8 8 8
Export:
Denmark 20 18 17 12 13 13
Norway 17 16 17 18 18 16
Sweden 17 17 16 17 16 19
The table shows that Sweden was the dominant country in intra-Scandinavian
trade, and that intra-Scandinavian trade did not amount to more than 11-13% of
15 Leon Dalgas Jensen, op. cit., pp. 65—66.
16 Leon Dalgas Jensen maintains that the Danes attended this meeting in August with the aim of
getting both the Norwegians and the Swedes to accept the European custom union, but left the idea
as soon as it seemed impossible, and went in for the Scandinavian cooperation instead, p. 65.
17 The figures are taken from Bo Stråth Nordic Industry and Nordic Economic Cooperation - The Nordic
Industrial Federations and the Nordic Customs Union Negotiations 1947-1959, (Dept. of History, Univ.
of Gothenburg, Almqvist & Wiksell Int., Stockholm, Sweden), p. 16.
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total Scandinavian trade. Of this, 7-8% was not subject to tariffs or quotas. If we
include the commodity trade, which was essentially liberalized and with tariffs not
exceeding 5%, it adds up to 40% of intra-Scandinavian trade. The Scandinavian
negotiations concerned the remaining 60% of the 11-13% of the total Scandinavian
trade.
It seems in this context to have been the political aspects of a Scandinavian
cooperation, the need for sticking together, that were decisive for Norwegian
politicians at the time. The underlying economic realities provided no extra
impetus, at least in a short-term perspective. The Norwegian proposal for closer
economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries represented a way to
demonstrate independence towards the United States and the Western European
countries, and not a genuine wish for cooperation. For the Norwegians, however,
Scandinavian cooperation soon acquired an intrinsic value in itself.
Helge Pharo has shown that the Norwegian attitude towards the Marshall Plan
during the autumn of 1947 changed from great reluctance towards a more positive
acceptance owing to the sudden discovery of an acute foreign exchange shortage. 18
Simultaneously, the Norwegian attitude towards the idea of closer Scandinavian
cooperation underwent significant change. Norway had been given the task to
formulate the Scandinavian committee's mandate. Norwegian planners rather
quickly realized that Norway stood to gain primarily from an extension of the
Scandinavian division of labour within a planned context rather than from a
customs union. This applied both to the existing industries, and particularly with
regard to new activity.19 This judgement was in itself not surprising. The Norwegian
Labour Party government's basic orientation towards a planned economy was
firm.
Even although the Labour Party was firmly in the saddle, it was still important
for the cabinet to stress that the will to negotiate with the Scandinavian neighbours
did not imply the establishment of a customs union. In the first place, Norway's
economic position, relatively less developed than that of Sweden and Denmark,
and with relatively higher tariff barriers, made the idea of a customs union highly
disputed, also within the governing party. This was stressed by Lange both in the
press and in the debate on the Speech from the Throne in the Storting in February
1948.20 Erik Brofoss for one stressed that the customs union was only an inferior
part of Scandinavian cooperation.21 Furthermore, it was still not clear what kind
of cooperation the Swedes and the Danes had in mind. Finally, the Labour
government had to consider the Norwegian opposition, which was highly sceptical
towards Scandinavian cooperation.22 All the centre-right parties, the Liberals, the
Conservatives, the Agrarians and the Christian People's Party, showed con-
siderable distrust of the neighbouring Scandinavian countries, particularly when
18 Helge Pharo, op. cit.
19 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 1. Remarks to the produced draft on mandate to the Common Nordic Committee
for Economic Co-operation, 27.10.47. The remarks are not signed.
20 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 1. VG, 19.01.48; and St. tid. 1948.
21 Erik Brofoss's private archives (hereafter EB), box 150. Brofoss' contribution in a discussion after a
lecture by the leader of the Danish delegation to the CNC, C. V. Bramsnajs, on the Nordic customs
union, 03.05.48.
22 For a fuller discussion of this, see Ingrid Sogner, op. cit., pp. 34—38.
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they were run by social democrats. They were also much concerned that Norway
should not again, as in the period from the 14th century until 1905, be dominated
by her neighbours. The term "union" grated in Norwegian cars.
The Common Nordic Committee for Economic Cooperation (CNC) was granted
its mandate in February 1948, and held its first meeting in April 1948. The mandate
was wider than the Norwegian negotiators originally had wanted, but still in
accordance with the plans drawn up by the Foreign Ministers' meeting in August
1947.23 The investigations concerning closer Scandinavian economic cooperation,
including a customs union, was thereby at the same time opened and removed
from the immediate political agenda: while the negotiators deliberated, the question
was of limited public interest until the spring of 1949.
2. An ambiguous Norwegian attitude towards a Scandinavian
cooperation?
In retrospect, the Norwegian attitude towards Scandinavian cooperation appears
rather ambiguous, from the CNC receiving its mandate in February 1948 until it
delivered its report in March 1954. On the one hand, the initiative to investigate
an extension of economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries came
from Norway, on the other Norway also adopted the most negative attitude
towards Scandinavian cooperation. How can this be explained?
The question of Scandinavian economic cooperation was taken off the agenda
soon after the CNC got its mandate, and security issues took centre stage. The
question of Norway's western alignment was vehemently debated within the
Labour party, yet was settled relatively quickly.24 The breakdown of the nego-
tiations for a Scandinavian Defence Pact and Norway's formal turn to the West
by becoming a member of NATO in April 1949 left the Norwegian Foreign Ministry
with the task of bridging the gap between the Scandinavian countries. Thus
Norway had to take other than merely economic considerations in the discussions
with Denmark and Sweden. Even Erik Brofoss, by then Norwegian Minister of
Trade, realized this when he in March 1949 explicitly handed the responsibility
for the decision about Scandinavian economic cooperation over to the Foreign
Ministry.25 Brofoss did this at a time when he himself was sceptical towards the kind
of cooperation being outlined by the CNC, being instead in favour of considering a
closer relationship with Britain.26
23 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 1. Resolution about Nordic economic co-operation, undated note: The committee was
to investigate questions of common interest for the four Nordic countries' economies, such as: (1) the
possibilities of establishing a common tariffas a precondition for a continued work towards a customs
union; (2) to reduce the tariffs and limit the quantitative trade restrictions between the Nordic countries;
(3) to expand the distribution of labour and the specialization between the countries, hereunder also new
productions; (4) to expand the already existing trade political cooperation outwards.
24 I will not go into those discussions; for profound analyses of the Norwegian debate, see Magne Skodvin,
Norden eller NATO? Utenriksdepartementet og alliansespersmalet 1947-1949, (Universitetsforlaget,
1971); Knut Einar Eriksen DNA og NATO, Striden om norsk NATO-medlemskap innen regjeringspartiet
1948-49 (Gyldendal, 1972); Knut Einar Eriksen "Norge i det vestlige samarbeidet", in Vekst og velstand,
Norsk politisk historic 1945-1965 (Universitetsforlaget, 1981).
25 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 3. Agreement between the Nordic countries (2 drafts): 07.03.49 and 12.04.49.
26 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 3. Note by Deputy Secretary Johan Melander in MFA, 02.02.49.
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Norway's relationship with Great Britain, constituted an impediment to the
success of the Scandinavian negotiations. Great Britain was Norway's most impor-
tant trading partner.27 The Norwegian government had in the autumn of 1948
turned to Great Britain, and suggested a coordination of the long-term programmes
of the two countries. The proposal was met with great enthusiasm on the British
side. According to Alan Milward, the British Labour Party had rife illusions about
Scandinavia in general.28 The British harboured the same dislike for the economic
policies of the continental countries as Norway, and the two countries had in
common elements of a planned economy, support for high employment and a high
investment level, and closely related views on the ends and means of economic
policy more generally.29
Norway, by this suggestion, sought to elicit financial support for her investment
programme, but Britain saw no advantages in such a proposal, and the result was
merely a British-Norwegian Economic committee. This committee met regularly
to discuss problems of cooperation, in particular those of trade policies. It never
acquired much importance, but contact between the two countries was established,
and both parties paid close attention to the connection. The Norwegian Foreign
Ministry considered this relationship with Britain of such importance in the spring
of 1949, that it did not want to establish any guidelines for Scandinavian cooperation
before the negotiations with Britain were settled.30
Within the CNC the Danes quickly put on pressure for a Scandinavian customs
union, led by C. V. Bramsnæs. He stressed the importance of first agreeing upon
the customs union. Other kinds of cooperation would be discussed later. In
addition, the CNC had extended its investigations to include concrete industrial
questions. The Norwegian delegation had therefore been supplemented by an
industrial expert, Director General Fredrik Vogt in the Norwegian Water and
Electricity Authority.
In spite of being the originator of the idea of Scandinavian economic cooperation
the Norwegian cabinet entertained increasing doubts as to its feasibility. At most,
it should be considered a long-term project. This view was most clearly expressed
in a Scandinavian cabinet-level conference at the end of October 1949. Norwegian
stements caused such a stir, especially among the Danish participants, that the
Norwegians temporarily had to backtrack.31 The Scandinavian meeting was held a
couple of days before an important meeting in the OEEC, where the distribution of
Marshall Plan funds for 1950 was to be discussed, and rumours had been leaked
about extended support to regional groupings. The result was a Scandinavian
agreement on forwarding new joint-Scandinavian projects, to be financed by
27 Tore Jørgen Hanisch, Veien til velstand; Trond Bergh Arbeiderbevegelsens historie, vol. 5, p. 293: In the
period 1946-50, 20% of the Norwegian commodity imports came from the UK, and the UK received
between 15 and 19% of the Norwegian commodity export.
28 Alan Milward, op. cit. p. 316.
29 Helge Ø.  Pharo in various articles, "The Third Force, Atlanticism and Norwegian Attitudes
towards European Integration" EUI Working Paper No. 86/255; "Norwegian Social Democrats and
European Integration in the 1950s" EUI Colloquium Paper 1988; "Norge, EF og europeisk samar-
beid" Intemasjonal Politikk nr. 6, 1988; Alan Milward, op. cit.; Trond Bergh in Arbeiderbevegelsens
historie, vol. 5; and Bergh in Vekst og velstand.
30 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 3. Note by Olaf Solli, 19.04.49.
31  Ingrid Sogner, op. cit. pp. 39-41.
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the ECA.32 These Scandinavian projects were compatible with the Norwegian
government's view on Scandinavian cooperation.
At the OEEC meeting, however, the Americans pressed their demand for a
common European market, without quantitative or monetary barriers.33 Though
the goal of the OEEC was to remove quantitative restrictions on the Western
European trade, at the time of the meeting most of them remained in place. In his
speech to the OEEC council on 31October 1949, the leader of the ECA, Paul
Hoffman, demanded "nothing less than" Western Europe's economic integration.
This was the first time the Americans put the demand forward in a public
statement. The OEEC was required to produce a plan that would eliminate most
quantitative restrictions and the dual pricing policies for domestic consumption
and exports by early 1950. As a step towards the integration of the European
economies the resulting OEEC resolution expressed the wish to establish regional
economic groups among the members of the OEEC where the conditions for a
closer economic cooperation already existed.34
In the wake of this OEEC-meeting the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Stafford Cripps, proposed to the three Scandinavian Foreign Ministers closer
cooperation between the UK and Scandinavia.35 Closer Scandinavian ties to the
Sterling Area, were mentioned as a possibility, and the four ministers agreed to
investigate this proposal on cabinet level. The immediate reactions differed among
the Scandinavian countries, however, the Norwegian government being genuinely
and wholeheartedly interested, whereas both Denmark and Sweden were
reluctant.36
This British initiative towards the Scandinavians was prompted by the threat
of the so-called Fritalux project, and it responded to the American demand for
regional cooperation. Extended economic cooperation between France, Italy and
the Benelux countries had been discussed since 1947, and after a French initiative
in September 1949 they had agreed to free capital flows and exchange rates.37 This
Fritalux agreement was backed by the Americans who regarded it as corresponding
to their views on how to free Westen European trade. The British initiative towards
the Scandinavians must in this perspective be seen as a tactical move vis-à-vis the
United States. A payments association between the UK and Scandinavia would
32ECA - European Cooperation Administration - administered the Marshall Plan from the American
side. This OEEC meeting both reactivated "old" Scandinavian cooperation proposals and initiated
new common-Scandinavian projects. A Norwegian proposal of transmission of energy from Norway
to Denmark had already been discussed for a while in the CNC, and was now taken up again, while
a Swedish-Norwegian cooperation on a free harbour in Trandelag, Norway, was among the new
proposals.
33 Alan Milward, op. cit. p. 303.
34 Public Records Office, Kew Gardens (PRO), Treasury T232/286. Telegram from Foreign Office to
the British Embassy in Oslo 3 December 1949. In line with Paul Hoffman's speech, the OEEC
Council also decided that each member was to remove quotas on half of its private imports at their
1948 level from the rest of the group by 15 December.
35 UD, 44 3/5, Uniscan, vol. I. Secret note by Lange 04.11.49.
36 RA, R0U 18.11.49, Minute by Arne Haarr, 19.11.49. I will not go into any of the deeper motives
Britain had by this suggestion, only refer to Alan Milward, op. cit. pp. 316-319, and Ingrid Sogner,
op. cit. pp. 42-54. The inter-war connection of the Scandinavian countries to the Sterling Area makes
the proposition quite explicable as well.
37 Alan Milward, op.cit. p. 306; Richard T. Griffiths & Frances B. Lynch, "The Fritalux/Finebel
Negotiations 1949/50" EUI Working Paper No. 84/117.
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make Fritalux look more isolated, and would point out to Washington that Fritalux
could split the Western world, and leave the UK the leader of a soft-currency
area.38 The connection between the UK and the Scandinavian countries was in
many ways natural. The Scandinavian countries had been attached to the Sterling
Area during the inter-war period, and held large quantities of sterling. Eventually,
this Anglo-Scandinavian project only resulted in a cooperation committee, Uniscan,
established in January 1950.39
Though the relationship of the Scandinavian countries with the UK was reactiv-
ated after the OEEC meeting in November 1949, it was, however, the completion
of the report that received most attention within the CNC. The customs union was
highlighted, and other investigations were largely ignored. The report's conclusion
created heavy discussion, as the Norwegian delegation opposed the Swedish and
Danish view that the customs union would be to the long-term advantage of
everybody. The controversy was resolved in a fuzzy compromise: whatever advan-
tages a Scandinavian customs union might bring the Scandinavian countries in
the long run, its actual implementation would cause certain difficulties all around.40
After the report from the CNC was put before the Scandinavian governments
on 3 January, 1950, Norway was blamed for the failure of the customs union.
Danish and Swedish newspapers led a frontal attack on Norway, discussing a
possible customs union between Denmark and Sweden. Bramsnæs, still the leader
of CNC, officially confirmed Norway's responsibility for the failure of the plans.41
The report was discussed at the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers' meeting in
March. At that meeting the Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange forwarded
a new proposal for closer Scandinavian cooperation; a Scandinavian free trade
area.42 This initiative had been worked out within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
between January and March 1950, subsequent to the negative reactions within
Denmark and Sweden. The officials in charge within the Ministry had expected
some adverse reactions, but were highly surprised by the outburst of criticism they
were subjected to.
The negative reactions on the part of the neighbouring nations fed on dis-
appointment. The Labour government during the autumn of 1949 had appeared
rather flexible. The Norwegian delegation to the OEEC had agreed to enlarge
upon the Scandinavian cooperation projects within that context. These measures
were taken at a time when the Scandinavian negotiators were concentrating on
the customs union. The assumption must have been that Norway was seriously
considering that option. When the Gerhardsen government rather abruptly turned
38 Alan Milward, op.cit. p. 317; PRO T232/285. Confidential note by the Board of Trade, 10 November
1949; T232/285. E. A. Hitchman to Sir Edward Bridges, 25 November 1949.
39 The Uniscan-agreement did, however, also include some freeing of the tourist currency- The
Norwegian government initially also expressed hopes of a cooperation with the UK on industrial
projects, but received signals that what the British government wanted was trade liberalization, an
easing of quantitative restrictions and convertibility of the Scandinavian kroner into pounds, and
did not push this wish. RA R0U 18 November 1949.
40 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 4a. Note by Olaf Solli on CNC's meeting Dec. 2.- 6 ., dated 06.12.49; MFA to
Ministry of Trade, 23.12.49; Nordic Economic co-operation Preliminary report to the governments of
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden from the Common Nordic Committee for Economic Co
operation, January 1950; in Stortingsmelding no. 87, 1954.
41 UD, 44 3/4, Paper-cut file.
42 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 5. Various documents.
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down the positive conclusion about a Scandinavian customs union, the Danes and
the Swedes were taken by surprise, and reacted accordingly.
On the Norwegian side, however, preference given to the customs union during
the autumn of 1949 within the CNC was not understood as abandoning the rest
of the investigations, and, consequently, a negative attitude towards the customs
union did not imply a negative attitude towards Scandinavian cooperation as such.
It is, however, also questionable whether the Danes and the Swedes really were as
surprised and angered as they appeared to be, or whether they just took the
opportunity to put the blame on Norway. In either case, within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs a more active Norwegian attitude was deemed necessary to maintain
some credibility in these questions.43 It was under these circumstances that Lange's
proposal for a free trade area was forwarded.
The proposal of a partial free trade area, designed by an independent committee
appointed by the Norwegian government, was positively welcomed at the Scan-
dinavian Foreign Minister's meeting in March.44 The three countries agreed to
investigate this proposal individually, which indicates that the Danes and the
Swedes accepted this proposal as an indication of Norwegian good will or at least
as something that could be further exploited. The responsible officers in the
Norwegian Foreign Ministry expressed satisfaction after this meeting because these
new guidelines were much more in accordance with what Norway had wanted
from the start in 1947, the commitments being less binding.45
The Norwegian government still considered the customs union a part of Scandi-
navian cooperation, but obviously had a different time schedule for implementing
it from that of Denmark and Sweden. Abandoning the customs union in 1949—
1950 did not imply giving up Scandinavian cooperation as such.      The Labour
government strongly supported a Scandinavian division of labour and joint Scandi-
navian projects, and looked forward to a Scandinavian customs union in the future.
Brofoss in particular emphasized the long-term commitment.
Danish and Swedish policies have not as yet been the subject of archive-based
historical analysis. Thus I have only been able to analyse their policies very
tentatively on the basis of material available in the Norwegian archives. We do
not know what the motives were for the strong pressure in favour of the customs
union at the time. They may have been based on a genuine interest in it as such
or they may have been more to do with the US dollars offered at the OEEC meeting
in November 1949. Whatever the goals, which most probably were not identical
for the two countries, the Danish and Swedish delegations both withdrew from the
negotiations once the Norwegians declined the customs union.
A Norwegian proposal for a Scandinavian free trade area in March 1950 was
intended to restore Norway's credibility in terms of Scandinavian cooperation. At
the same time the Norwegian government pointed out that cooperation had to be
considered in a long-term perspective. The Norwegian proposals involved business
cooperation and trade issues, and as such implied a postponement of actual
43 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 5. Letter from Lange to Arne Skaug, Norway's delegate in Paris (OEEC), 16.03.50.;
and RA, Government's conference 09.03.50.
44 See note no. 43.
45 UD 44 3/4, vol. 5. Minute of a meeting in MFA, 27.03.50, between representatives from different
Ministries and members of the CNC.
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decisions, which was what the Norwegian negotiators above all wanted from the
discussions.
The CNC was given a new mandate after a Scandinavian Foreign and Trade
Ministers' meeting in November 1950. It was much in line with the Norwegian
committee's suggestions in March 1950. This time around the CNC was to
investigate the fundamental and technical problems involved in abolishing the
tariff rates between the Scandinavian countries within certain sectors or for certain
commodities.46 The CNC was to investigate areas where cooperation could be of
common Scandinavian interest, and as such be the subject of further analysis. This
joint statement seemed to imply that the Norwegian point of view had been
accepted in the Scandinavian forum. No commitment was made to the customs
union, only the preconditions for establishing a customs union were to be investigated.
The Norwegian negotiators were very satisfied with the outcome. 47
The new agreement proved temporary, and it is tempting to consider it a result
of a lack of interest on the part of the Swedes and Danes once the customs union
was given up. As far as Denmark was concerned a growing interest in the
continental plans for agricultural cooperation, "the Green Pool", also played a
part.48 In terms of ideology and culture the Scandinavian countries were quite
close. Such factors, however, did not contribute to solving Denmark's agricultural
export problem. Danish interest in Scandinavian cooperation was therefore con-
ditioned by the need to avoid endangering access to British and Continental
markets.
The atmosphere in the CNC during the new round of discussions, was acri-
monious and unproductive. The rivalry between the Danish and Norwegian
delegations, particularly that between C. V. Bramsnæs and Fredrik Vogt, was
not conducive to constructive analysis. As opposed to the preceding period, the
Norwegians were active whereas the Danes and the Swedes adopted a waiting
attitude.49 The Norwegians were the only ones to take up the tasks demanded by
the CNC from the delegations - a wide and thorough investigation and surveying
of all the different industries in question.
As a member of the OEEC, Norway had to join in the process of trade
liberalization, but remained sceptical towards the continental countries and their
plans for further European cooperation. In the period between 1950 and 1954
various elements of sector planning were being introduced, and these were more
in line with Norwegian thinking on cooperation.50 But the Scandinavian option
was still accorded priority in Norway.
46  UD, 44 3/4, vol. 5. Letter from H. Lange to the Norwegian members of the CNC, 27.11.50; and St.
meld. no. 87/1954, pp. 5-7.
47 UD, 44 3/4, vol.  Note by Olaf Solli, 24.08.50.
48 Vibeke Sørensen in "How to Become a Member of the Club without Joining - Danish Policy with
Respect to European sector Integration Schemes, 1950-1957", Scandinavian Journal of History, vol.
16:2, (1991), pp. 111-116.
49 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 6. Note to the Foreign Minister by Olaf Solli, 29.09.50.
50 Sectoral integration was limited to specified key-products or areas, and thereby a form of cooperation
not so full of conflicts. The Schuman Plan is one example that was established, but other plans were
proposed without being formally introduced, such as the Stikker Plan, the Pella Plan and the Petche
Plan. For a thorough analysis of the various sectorial proposals, see the contributions in Richard T.
Griffiths, op. cit.
Scand. J. History 18
The European Idea: The Scandinavian Answer 319
The former Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft's suggestion in the late summer
of 1951 to establish a Nordic interparliamentary council created much debate,
especially on the Norwegian side. It did eventually result in the Nordic Council,
which held its first meeting in February 1953. When we compare the opposition
against the Nordic Council with that against Scandinavian economic cooperation,
we see that it originated in the same quarters in Norway, within the non-socialist
parties, and that it was rooted in a fear of giving away elements of national
sovereignty.51
About the same time as the proposal of the Nordic Council was forwarded, the
Danish delegation in the CNC again tried to press for a Scandinavian customs
union. This time the Norwegian delegation was better prepared for the pressure.
After heated discussions, the Norwegian government realized that the problems
had to be solved on the political level, and the CNC was at last asked to deliver
its final report.52 The report was handed over to the Scandinavian governments in
March 1954. However, it presented two conclusions: one by the Norwegian
members of the CNC, and the other a joint one by the Danes and Swedes.
The Norwegian experts were, with few exceptions, opposed to a "common
Scandinavian market".53 Positive signals, however, came from the Norwegian fish
processing industry, which considered a bigger market an advantage. In this field,
Norway was met by Danish and Swedish opposition, because of Norway's strong
position. In other words, not only Norway, but all three nations were acting mainly
in their own interests, and they were all considering the question in a mainly short-
term perspective. The will to compromise was not strong at this stage.
What could be called the two-faced, or ambiguous, Norwegian attitude towards
Scandinavian cooperation, is, however, not the correct label for the Norwegian
approach. What from the outside appears as ambiguity, with Norway taking the
initiatives, but at the same time being the most negative, turns out to be a
comprehensive view with a wide-ranging perspective, reaching much further than
the Danish and Swedish plans. This Norwegian attitude had been in development
throughout the years from 1947, and in 1954 it was expanded even further.
3. Norwegian pragmatism
The year 1954 stands out in the Scandinavian negotiations. The question of closer
Scandinavian cooperation again became a hot topic in the press and the Storting.
The domestic Norwegian clashes of interests reached a new level of intensity. In
the course of five months, the Labour government abandoned its negative stance
expressed from January through March 1954, and at the meeting of the Nordic
51On the establishment of Nordisk Råd, see Håvard Narum Hvordan Nordisk Råd bis til, "Hovedfags"-
thesis in history (autumn 1972, Oslo).
52 Among the solutions that were being considered in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was a new
Norwegian proposal for a Nordic customs union - on a sectoral basis!
53 In the report from the CNC in March 1954, as in many other contexts at that time (and now), the
concepts were mixed up and used in a confusing way. In the report "a common Nordic market" was
used as a collective term for what the CNC, according to its mandate, had investigated, namely a
"partial" or "limited Nordic free trade area", and not something synonymous with what was defined
as a "common market" according to GATT's definitions.
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Council in August 1954 promoted a resolution favouring a customs union. The
centre-right parties at the same time engaged in active opposition.
Norway's economic position in 1953-1954 encouraged the government to take
this step, and Minister of Trade Erik Brofoss was the driving force behind this
turn of policy. A huge deficit on the trade balance and a lack of investment capital
forced the cabinet to take action. A solution was found in extending Scandinavian
cooperation, which would involve Swedish investments, as well as increased capital
flows from Great Britain. This was not an entirely new strategy, as we have seen
it was previously attempted by Brofoss. Discussions were moved up to cabinet
level, however, rather than being pursued within the CNC. This was a deliberate
move to achieve a kind of cooperation more in accordance with actual Norwegian
needs.
The new Norwegian offensive in the spring of 1954 was primarily aimed at
promoting joint Scandinavian projects. The reasons were twofold: the lack of
capital, and the fear of the termination of EPU as a payments' association.54 Brofoss
was still very much opposed to the idea of a Scandinavian customs union, and still
primarily a promoter of increased Scandinavian division of labour. This Norwegian
preference had generally given way to Danish and Swedish interests and pressure
for a customs union during the previous negotiations. In the spring of 1954 Brofoss
changed his line of argument somewhat. A progressively stronger Germany had
come to be considered a threat, and it appeared that the Norwegian government
on this basis was winning support for its cooperative proposals.
Labour's modernization policy had met with opposition from the centre-right
parties, as well as from within the Labour Party. This was partly opposition in
principle against the substantial public sector engagement, and partly opposition
against making the manufacturing industry the country's main source of income.55
In 1954 the country still needed a massive injection of capital, especially for the
export industry. The government was bent on rationalizing the industrial sector.
The so-called ashtray industries which expanded under the cover of postwar
protection, represented an obstacle to change. Increasing productivity through
liberalization and cooperation was seen as a means to change the industrial
structure of Norway.
Brofoss had for some time maintained that the basic structural problem in
Norway was the need for new capital, which by far exceeded the country's ability
to save. Cooperation with Sweden would provide more capital for hydroelectric
power generation than would be possible if Norway were to operate on a national
basis. In Brofoss's opinion it would be feasible to find some capital in other
Scandinavian countries through cooperation on specific projects, but primarily it
would be easier to gain capital from the World Bank for joint Scandinavian projects
54 In 1953-1954, the question of making the British pound convertible, was discussed seriously. This
would mean the conclusion of the The European Payments Union. See Sally Dore, "The European
Payments Union", Paper for 1992 in Historical Perspective (Brussels, July 1989).
The EPU had, after the conclusion of the Marshall Plan, constituted the basis for Norway's
investment policy, so from the Norwegian point of view, the convertibility of the pound was
threatening. There had, however, been some talk of a Scandinavian inclusion into the Sterling Area,
both on the British and on the Norwegian sides.
55  Trond Bergh, Arbeiderbevegelsens historie, vol. 5, p. 163.
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than for national ones. From the autumn of 1953 to the end of March 1954 the
Norwegian and Swedish governments discussed possible projects.56
The situation in the spring of 1954 was similar to that of 1949-1950. At both
times the Norwegian government was finally forced to take a stand, and the CNC
to produce a report. On both occasions the Norwegian delegation refused to accept
a customs union, but waxed positive about Scandinavian cooperation otherwise.
The difference lies mainly in the greater intensity of Norwegian opposition in the
spring of 1954. Detailed investigations of trade flows had shown to what extent
Norwegian interests would suffer in a Scandinavian customs union. However, these
findings were toned down when the Norwegian government took the initiative in
the spring of 1954. The new approach was considered crucial by the Norwegian
government. Thus it once more had to modify its negative attitude towards a
customs union. In August 1954, at a meeting of the Nordic Council, the Norwegian
government once again accepted a Scandinavian customs union in principle.
Agreement was reached so as to prepare the ground for a Scandinavian common
market covering the widest possible range of products, to lift the investigations on
to a governmental level, solve concrete investment and production problems, and
cooperate on research.57 However, the agreement still demonstrated the difference
between Norway on the one side, and Denmark and Sweden on the other. The
Norwegian delegation emphasized investment and cooperation in production,
while the Danes and the Swedes emphasized trade liberalization.
The outcome of the meeting caused an uproar in Norway, and the decisions
were modified at a cabinet-level meeting in Harpsund, Sweden, in late October
1954. The Norwegian government could not ignore the opposition from the centre-
right parties and business circles. However, the resolution calling for a Scandi-
navian customs union was maintained in principle. With this modification the
opposition was pacified. The point of departure for the new round of negotiations
was much like the one in 1947: a resolution was passed on a Scandinavian customs
union, even although the Labour government primarily wanted cooperation on
specific projects.
The investigations about Scandinavian cooperation continued as decided in
Harpsund. The CNC was dissolved, and a new cooperation committee - the Nordic
Economic Cooperation Committee (NECC) - was established. A "Cooperation
Minister" from each of the three Scandinavian countries was appointed, a decision
which moved the negotiations up to cabinet level.58 The NECC immediately began
work on its two tasks. First, it was to elaborate a framework for a Scandinavian
common market, with a common tariff and an elimination of the internal restric-
tions. Second, it was to define precise rules for cooperation within certain trades.
There was an intimate link between the two tasks. Cooperation on production
would also affect tariffs and trade restrictions. In addition to investigating the
commodities relatively unhampered by restrictions, the new committee was also
56 The questions were Swedish transit  through harbours in  the Trondheims fjord,  the Boliden
concession, Swedish production of nitrogen and development of the Nea watercourse.
57 Bo Stråth , op. cit., pp. 123-124; Document no. 11 (1954), Report from the Norwegian representatives
tothe Nordic Council's second session in Oslo, 9-18 August.
58 The Norwegian "Cooperation Minister" was the Minister of Trade Nils Langhelle. Erik Brofoss was,
since June 1954, Director of Norges Bank - the Norwegian National Bank.
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allowed to investigate the iron and steel industry, the electro-metallurgic, chemical metal,
and semi-manufactured metal industry, totalling 70-75% of the inter-Scandinavian trade.
These were all commodities of special interest to Norway, and of only limited interest to
Denmark. The Danish delegation therefore wanted to include the machine industry into
the investigations. The Norwegian delegation only reluctantly accepted this, after having
heavily stressed that only investigations were authorized. According to both the Danish and
the Swedish delegation, the NECC also had a mandate to investigate other industries. The
Norwegian delegation refused to accept this point, referring to opposition from
Norwegian business and public opinion.59
It has been maintained that the Scandinavian question was dead after the NECC received
its new mandate, the reason being the Norwegian government's lack of interest. My
conclusion is the opposite. My claim is that Norway was especially interested in the
Scandinavian question around and after 1954, and made a relatively good bargain in
Harpsund with the exception of having to accept the principle of the customs union.
For Denmark it was important to secure access for her agricultural products on the
continental markets, both as a short-term and a long-term target. After 1951, Denmark
had therefore been interested in the continental agricultural plan, "the Green Pool", at the
expense of Scandinavian cooperation. However, it proved impossible to reach any
agreement over "the Green Pool". Denmark had also flirted with the ECSC during
1953.60 Sweden, on the other hand, maintained a low profile, towards both continental
cooperation and Scandinavian cooperation. Sweden's main target was a more liberal trade
regime. In the Scandinavian negotiations, however, it was difficult for Sweden to push that
goal strongly because of her more advantageous position. Sweden's role in the Scandinavian
negotiations in consequence appears rather low key, at least within the cooperation
committees, compared with that of the frequent and loud antagonists, Denmark and
Norway.
The NECC delivered its first report at the end of December 1955. The concrete
proposals in the report covered eight fields of trade, representing 45% of inter-
Scandinavian trade. The Scandinavian governments were not to consider the report
before further investigations were completed. However, the report was seriously
considered in the Nordic Council, where the Norwegian centre-right parties voiced their
objections, and wanted a decision taken on the issue already at this point. The Danish,
the Swedish and the Norwegian governmental representatives, on the other hand, were all
very positive towards the report from the NECC, and wanted to continue the effort.
Much of the Norwegian opposition against Scandinavian economic cooperation was
based on the fear that Norwegian business would suffer. The Norwegian Federation of
Industries (Norges Industriforbund) held the opinion that a Scandinavian market would be
too limited.61 It looked instead to wider European, North Atlantic or global liberalization.
The opposition also expressed fears of British reprisals if Norway involved itself deeper
with the Scandinavian neighbours. Such
59 Bo Strath, op. cit., p. 127.
60 Vibeke Sørensen, "How To Become. . .", pp. 7-20.
61 See for example EB Box 151, Letter from NI to the Ministry of Trade 15.12.49, confirmed in letter
20.10.58.
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fears were unfounded, however, as the Minister of Trade Arne Skaug tried to
convince the opposition.62
The most ambitious idea on the part of Brofoss was that of a Scandinavian iron
and steel combine, which was to make the Scandinavian region self-sufficient,
independent of the continental steel trusts, by merging Swedish and Norwegian
steel industries. This implied a wide-ranging division of labour, including special-
ization as between iron and steel companies, and represented a clear attempt at
cartel-building on a Scandinavian basis.
The proposal met with strong Swedish opposition as the Swedish iron and steel
industry feared that the Scandinavian governments were trying to establish control
over the process of production. The Swedish government, on the other hand,
viewed this cooperative attempt positively.63 Denmark, too, accorded priority to
the Scandinavian plans between 1954 and 1956, and viewed it as advantageous if
the Scandinavian countries as a region could become independent in steel produc-
tion, with cooperation in production as a first step. Scandinavian steel production
was, however, not sufficient to meet demand, so Danish opinion was that a
Scandinavian common market should not maintain tariffs against third countries.
Even though Denmark in this period gave priority to the Scandinavian plans,
the Danish government did conduct discussions with the High Authority of the
ECSC about Danish association. However, the conditions set by the High Authority
did not fit into the Scandinavian plans and Denmark also feared that her traditional
trade with the UK could be adversely affected by this agreement, so the attempt was
abandoned in March 1956.64 It seems, in other words, that all of the Scandinavian
countries gave priority to the Scandinavian plans at the time when the EEC entered
the arena.
Norway's relationship with the OEEC had generally been good since its inception
in 1948, mainly because of its intergovernmental practices which concurred with
the Norwegian view on international cooperation.  As a consequence, although
somewhat reluctantly, Norway had also adhered to the OEEC's plan for quota
reductions since 1948. The tariff problem, however, was still a contentious issue,
both on a Scandinavian and on a European level. At the Scandinavian level, the
relatively higher Norwegian tariffs, which in addition had been raised in 1952,
reduced even further the interest of Norwegian industries in a closer Scandinavian
economic association, and increased that of Danish and Swedish industries. At the
European level, the OEEC's plan for quota reductions was considered unfair by
European low tariff countries - the Benelux countries and Switzerland in addition
to the three Scandinavian countries. High tariffs in many ways neutralized the
effect of quota elimination. This "Low Tariff Club" had therefore pressed the
OEEC to shift its focus from import restrictions to the tariff issue, and in July 1956
the "Low Tariff Club" had come so far as to introduce their automatic tariff
62 Skaug was Minister of Trade from January 1955, after having been leader for the Norwegian
delegation to the OEEC in Paris from 1949. Skaug must have had this information from British
officials.
63 Bo Stråth, op. cit., p. 128.                                                                                                                         '
64 Johnny Laursen, "Mellom Faellesmarkedet og frihandelszonen. Dansk markedspolitik, 1956-58", p.
6, a pilot work on his research project Denmark, Europe and the Market: The Making of Denmark's
European Policy 1955 to the Mid-Sixties.
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reduction plan.65 This was done at a time when the six countries, Belgium, France,
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany, already had agreed to
create a customs union in May 1956.
The agreement on establishing a customs union between the six, but also the
automatic tariff reduction plan, triggered the British proposal for an industrial free
trade area covering the OEEC countries. The proposal was meant to derail the
tariff reduction plan, and undermine the EEC.66 The British proposal of the larger
OEEC-based free trade area did not seem so interesting to the Norwegians at first.
The positive attitude that the Norwegian government soon adopted, however, was
based on a judgement that Norway could not categorically refuse a proposition
from her most important trading partner and political supporter, the UK.67
The NECC had already from August 1956 emphasized that the Scandinavian
countries had to cooperate in the negotiations on the wider free trade area. 68 The
idea of Scandinavian cooperation within the larger European framework seemed
in many ways natural, and there was therefore no reason for interrupting the
Scandinavian investigations, which, according to the plans, were to be concluded
in the course of the spring of 1957.69
The Norwegian government still gave priority to the Scandinavian investigations
during the autumn of 1956, even though it also actively participated in the European
discussions. In these circumstances Erik Brofoss tried to get the government to
advance a decision in the Scandinavian negotiations, but the government did not
want to rush into any kind of decision.70 The government's information about the
British attitude towards the Scandinavian plans, did not indicate that it needed to
take any decision yet.71
4. The parallel plans
The range and the intensity of the wider free trade area negotiations during the
spring and summer of 1957, however, brought home to the Scandinavian nego-
tiators that their plans for cooperation had to be seen in the light of the European
ones, and not the other way round. None of the Scandinavian governments wanted
to take a decision in any of the negotiations before both alternatives were fully
investigated, which prevented any decision from being taken in the Scandinavian
65 Johnny Laursen, op. cit. p. 4; Wendy Asbeek-Brusse, West European Tariff Plans 1947-1959. From
Study Group to Common Market (PhD. thesis EUI, Firenze 1991), pp. 183-229.
66 Richard Griffiths, "British attitudes towards European integration", EFTA History II, in EFTA Bulletine
2/1991, pp. 21-22.
67 Svein Hansen: Det norske EFTA-sporet i 1950-åra - en studie av Norges Europa-politikk, med sarlig vekt på
perioden 1956-1960, "hovedfags" thesis in history (University of Oslo, autumn 1990).
68 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 15. Protocol from the 9th meeting in the NECC, 29-30 August 1956.
69 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 15. Note by Dagfin Juel, 1 October, 1956, Forholdet mellom et nordisk markedog et
vesteuropeisk marked (The relationship of a Nordic Market and a West-European Market). Dagfin Juel
was the Norwegian representative in the OEEC working group no. 17.
70 EB, Box 151. Letter from Brofoss to Eivind Erichsen, 1 February 1957, in which he especially stressed
his fear of Germany: "I gladly admit that I am allergic to the Germans."[...], "Personally I am sure
that it will be a disaster to get Germany as a dominating state on the continent."
71 Both the British Board of Trade and the Foreign Office had carried out investigation as to whether
the UK had anything to fear from the possible Scandinavian cooperation, and the result was negative.
This information must have been forwarded to the Scandinavians. See for example PRO FO371/
122093, Letter to A. H. Lincoln in Copenhagen from T. Brimelow in FO, 19.9.56.
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negotiations.72 In February 1957, the British in vain tried to get a resolution in
principle on the wider free trade area, and then in March the Treaty of Rome was
signed. This meant in reality that "the Six's" governments were immobilized until
the treaty was ratified.
The Scandinavian negotiations were largely completed by October 1957, and
the report from the NECC was handed over to the Scandinavian governments.
The plans for a wider free trade area had, however, created a situation where a
solution to the Scandinavian question had become totally dependent on the progress
of the European plans. The European process in October 1957 got a new lift,
when the OEEC Ministerial Meeting carried a new resolution which moved the
negotiations on to a governmental level, with the establishment of the Maudling
Committee and the inclusion of agricultural products.73
Immediately after the completion of the report and the new wave of activity
within the OEEC negotiations, the Scandinavian governments decided to extend
the Scandinavian investigations to include the remaining 20% of inter-Scandi-
navian trade, so that the two sets of plans covered the same areas.74 Any decision
in the Scandinavian negotiation was thus officially postponed, and it was to take
more than a year before the Norwegian government made another move. This
passive Norwegian attitude was explained by the need to wait for the completion
of the European plans, in line with the Scandinavian agreement.
The extension of the Scandinavian negotiations meant the inclusion offish and
agricultural products. This hardly mitigated the Scandinavian conflicts, it rather
brought them more clearly to the surface. The work of the NECC was further
complicated by the fact that the questions were under investigation in the Wider
free trade area negotiations, and especially since the deadline for a Scandinavian
common market was set at 1 January, 1959. The additional report from the NECC
was completed in September 1958, so that a Scandinavian solution was premissed
on the assumption that a European Free Trade Area was to be established. The
Scandinavian proposal did, however, contain some reservations. In the industrial
sector these were not of any importance. In the two sectors of agricultural and fish
products no agreements were reached. The Norwegian government still did not
want to take any decision in the Scandinavian questions.
After the negotiations for a Wider free trade area reached a deadlock in November
1958, the Nordic Council once again intervened and decided that the Scandinavian
negotiations were to be resumed. The Scandinavian governments had still not
given up the Scandinavian alternative. At the same time, the countries that
had been most in agreement with one another within the wider free trade area
negotiations, the three Scandinavian countries, Britain, Austria and Switzerland,
started non-committing talks regarding a smaller free trade area.
The Scandinavian governments did not shelve the Scandinavian alternative until
July 1959, even though the governments gave priority to the European negotiations.
72 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 16. Memorandum from a meeting in the NECC, Feb. 25, 1957.
73 Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (Oxford University Press, 1964), p.
135.
74 UD, 44 3/4, vol. 18. Memo from the 65th meeting in the Norwegian coordination committee for
Nordic economic affairs (Norsk samordningsutvalg for nordiske økonomiske saker), 19.11.1957; RA,
Governmental conference 8.1.1958.
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A Scandinavian solution had adherents in high positions in Norway also after
EFTA became the most attractive alternative. None of the Scandinavian govern-
ments dared to press a Scandinavian solution within EFTA, but continued to
emphasize the importance of Scandinavian cooperation even after the resolution
on EFTA.
5. Conclusion
The event that triggered the investigations about a Scandinavian customs union
was the Marshall Plan and the American demand for a closer European cooper-
ation. When the Scandinavian countries in the summer of 1947 sat down to
examine the possibilities of creating a customs union, however, it was not done to
accommodate the American demands for regional integration, or because of the
possible economic advantages of the Marshall Plan, rather the opposite. The
Norwegian initiative was caused by the wish to contain American pressure, and
supported by a firm belief in its own economic strength. It was forwarded to secure
relative Norwegian and Scandinavian independence, not as a means for cooperation
in a larger context.
Alan Milward has judged the Norwegian proposal for closer Scandinavian
cooperation as "no more than a way of saving face and refusing to admit to the
world the reality of profound Scandinavian disunity".75 Milward does have a point,
but appears to have underestimated the force of ideals and long-term economic
goals of the Scandinavian governments.
During the autumn of 1947, even before the Scandinavian investigations got
under way, the Norwegian government saw positive advantages in extended
Scandinavian cooperation on a broader basis. One of the reasons for the more
positive turn of the Norwegian government was the shortage of hard currency
uncovered during the summer, but the government also saw long-term advantages
in extended Scandinavian cooperation in the sense of specialization, distribution
of labour and of production on a larger scale. These goals were, however, as yet
only vaguely formulated. The Norwegian Labour government was never interested
in a Scandinavian customs union at any given moment during these twelve years
of investigations and planning. This becomes clear when we look at Norwegian
policy in isolation - it stands out as a policy of consistency. Confronted with both
the pressures from Denmark and Sweden and other external demands, however,
the Norwegian policy functioned as highly confusing and full of contrasts.
The Norwegian hope for broadly based Scandinavian cooperation, yet without
a customs union, grew inversely in proportion to Danish and Swedish pressure for
a customs union, in the sense that when the Norwegian government concentrated
on the Scandinavian plans, it also had to adopt a pragmatic attitude in order to
achieve some of its own ideas. The end result was the acceptance of the customs
union. This happened both in 1948 and in 1954, though most evidently in 1954.
The development of the Norwegian attitude towards closer Scandinavian econ-
omic cooperation within the twelve years the question was considered, can be
broadly subdivided into three periods. The first period extended from the end of
75 Alan Milward, op. cit. p. 251.
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1947 to 1953—1954. The Norwegian government then concentrated on recon-
struction and internal economic problems. The planned economy approach of the
first postwar years also contained elements of protectionism, and implied a hesistant
attitude towards the Scandinavian plans that were based on removing trade
barriers.
From about 1953 to 1954, the Norwegian government took a far more active
role in these questions, trying to fit the Scandinavian prospects into their planning,
emphasizing a Scandinavian "home market". With that approach the Labour
government showed far greater willingness to compromise. The long-term goal of
greater efficiency and export-led growth was given stronger support in terms of
opening the economy.
The next shift took place, perhaps not surprisingly, when the Wider European
Free Trade plans presented a new challenge for Norway. The new possibilities
were first realized during the spring and summer of 1957. Within the context of
the greater OEEC-based free trade area, the Scandinavian solution remained alive,
but in a secondary place.
The firm Norwegian refusal to join a Scandinavian customs union, created the
impression of Norway as wholly negative towards Scandinavian cooperation. In
fact, elements within the Norwegian government, the Labour Party and the
higher echelons of the bureaucracy gradually developed wide-ranging plans for
Scandinavian cooperation, and Norway appears to have been more preoccupied
with the process of the Scandinavian alternative than was Denmark. Denmark
leaned more towards the continental plans than both Norway and Sweden because
of the importance of agricultural exports. When at times Denmark concentrated
on the Scandinavian alternative, the pressure was towards a customs union. It is,
however, unclear as to how much of the Danish pressure for a customs union was
in fact directed by the Danish government and to what extent it was private
pressure from C. V. Bramsnaes. Sweden, on the other hand, had everything to gain
from closer Scandinavian cooperation, but was careful about putting overt pressure
on Norway and Denmark. In addition, we saw that some Swedish industries
were reluctant to being exposed to government regulation within a framework of
Scandinavian production cooperation.
The failure of the Scandinavian plans was determined by the often incompatible
ideas and divergent interests of the three countries. Internal Norwegian opposition
certainly played its part, but the alleged negative attitude of the Labour government
cannot be substantiated.
One of the points of this article has also been to show the gradually changing
international context. This is a point which the Scandinavians, though strong-
headed and self-centred, did not fail to observe. By the time the Scandinavian
plans were in a condition where they could be implemented, the context was gone.
The Scandinavian investigations cleared the ground for the establishment of
EFTA, and in the course of two years of EFTA cooperation intra-Scandinavian
economic cooperation in many fields had reached the levels the negotiators had
sought during the preceding years. As early as 1963 Sweden overtook Great Britain
to become Norway's most important trading partner.
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